In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, earning angry criticism from around the world. The reason is that the decision - to attack the post-Soviet republic and harm its citizens - was unjustifiable and constituted a serious war crime under international law. The humanitarian crisis put Germany to the test regarding its own willingness to abandon Ostpolitik - a historic strategic partnership with Moscow. To understand the turning point, it is worth remembering that the attempt to ease tensions with the then USSR made by German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the 1970s, while pragmatic, was motivated less by economic calculation than by a national sense of guilt for Nazi violence. Ostpolitik did not mean accepting communist doctrine or the Kremlin's geopolitical interests on the European continent, nor did it mean favouring industry, but establishing diplomatic relations to avoid armed conflict at all costs. But the hope for common ground between the West and the East has proved false over the years, especially with the rise of Vladimir Putin's Russia. This has shocked many people who truly believed in change through rapprochement. For obvious reasons, the aggression against Ukraine represented a final reckoning with the past. This dissertation analyses strategies of defence, reconciliation and détente in Germany from the Cold War until today. It will also shed light on how the violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity has thrown Ostpolitik over the edge, probably to the point of no return. Finally, it will attempt to predict future changes in Germany's attitude towards Russia on the one hand and the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) on the other.